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7. The sketch-specification f monoidal categories 
The difficulty in sketch-specifying the concept of monoidal category is with arrang- 
ing that the morphisms of sketches become in the doctrine the lent necessarily strict 
monoidal functors. To achieve this effect, we modify the concept of monoidal category 
to what we call “anamonoidal category”. The resulting concept can be directly treated 
by the approach of the present paper. Also, the ana-version has some other virtues 
pointed out below. 
The idea is that all structure on a category should be determined exactly up to 
isomorphism; in our case, the unit object and the tensor products should be deter- 
mined exactly up to isomorphism. This has two aspects. One is that, although (e.g.) the 
tensor of objects A and B is not unique, any two values of it are isomorphic. The other 
is that if C is isomorphic to (a value of) A 0 B, then C itself is a possible value of 
A 0 B. The right way of doing this involves “specifications”, a new part of the 
structure. 
I note that some of the ideas of this section appear, in a greater generality, in [27]. 
An anamonoidal category C is given by data (i) to (vii), subject to conditions (viii) to 
(xvi). 
(i) An underlying category, also denoted by C. 
(ii) Abstract sets (classes) Un [Cl, Ten [C] of unit specijcations and tensor specijca- 
tions, respectively. 
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(iii) Each unit specification u E Un [C] picks out an object l,, a unit object; and any 
two u, v E Un [C] pick out an isomorphism i,.,: I,2 I,. 
(iv) Each tensor specification s picks out a triple [s] = (A, B, C) = (A,, B,, C,) 
of three specific objects; we write A @,B for C although A, B are also deter- 
mined by s (that is, it is not the case that we have an operation 0, defined on all pairs 
(A, B)). It is possible that two difleerent s, t E Ten[C] pick out the same triple 
(A,, B,, C,) = (A,, B,, ‘3 
(v) Given two tensor specifications , t, with corresponding objects A, B, A @,B 
and C, D, C 0, D, together with arrows f: A + C, g: B + D, we have the arrow 
f&g : A 0, B + C 0, D determined by the pair (s, t). 
(vi) i,,,, : I, 0, A% A, pu, t: A at I,-% A for any appropriate specifications 
u E Un [Cl, S, t E Ten [C] (“appropriate” means, for S, that [s] = (I,, A, I 0, A)). 
(vii) With any four appropriate specifications sO, si, s2, s3, giving rise to 
A @,, B, B O,, C, A O,, (B Q,, C), (A OS, B) @,, C, we have a corresponding associatiu- 
ity isomorphism 
CI so,sI. s2..s3 : A Q,, (B Q,, Cl 4 (A Qs, B) Qs, C 
determined by (s,,, sl, s2, s3). 
(viii) (Existence of unit and of tensor) Un [C] is inhabited: it is not empty; for any 
A, B E Oh(C), there is at least one s E Ten [C] such that A, = A, B, = B. 
(ix) i,,, 0 i,,, = i,,, (u, v, w E Un [Cl). 
(x) (Functoriality of the tensor) lA @,,, 1, = l,@,, (A, B E Oh(C), s giving rise 
to A 0, B); for any a : A -+ A’, a’ : A’ + A”, b : B + B’, b’ : B’ + B” and specifications 
s, SI, St1 giving rise to A 0, B, A’ @,, B’, A” O,,, B”, resp., we have 
(a’ OS,, S” b’) 0 (a OS,,, b) = (a’ 0 a) &,, (b’ 0 b). 
(xi) (Naturality of 2 and p) 
(xii) (Naturality of a) 
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(xiii) (Associativity coherence) 
(xiv) (Triangular coherence) 
(xv) (Unique transfer under isomorphism of unit specijcation) For any u E Un [C] 
and isomorphism 8: I,3 A, there is a unique u E Un [C] such that I, = A and i,, = B. 
(xvi) (Unique transfer under isomorphism of tensor specijication) Given s E Ten [C] 
giving rise to A 0, B, and any isomorphism i : A 0, B-% C, there is a unique 
t E Ten [C] such that [t] = (A, B, C) and i = lA OS,1 ,. 
This says that if we have specified a tensor, and we have an isomorphism of the 
tensor to another object, we are free to re-specify the tensor as the new object, with 
marking the given isomorphism as the corresponding tensor of the identity arrows 
involved; moreover, the notion of tensor specification is “tight” in the sense that there 
is a unique new specification with the described properties. 
This definition is rather complicated; what is its raison d’etre? 
(A) We have the classical notion of monoidal category as described in [23, S]. 
Given any monoidal category (C, I, 0, IX, A, p), we can define an anamonoidal one, 
C (a,, as follows. We put Ten [Cca,] to consist of all entities of the form 
s=(A,B,i:AOB~C)=(A,,B,,i,:A,OB,-%C,); of course, A@,B,C. 
Given s, t E Ten [C&J, and a : A, -+ A,, b : B, ---f Bt, we define a a,,, b by the following 
commutative diagram: 
AsOBs 
a@b 
,A,QB, 
I it 
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In particular, we have s[A, B] d% (A, B, 1 A B B) E Ten [Cca, J and we obtain that for 
any s E Ten CCd 6 = (IA, @s,s[A,, B,] lB,)- I. The a ssociativity isomorphisms are de- 
fined, very predictably, to make 
a 1. R. t- 
commute. One easily sees that the unique transfer property for tensor specifications 
holds. I leave the definition of the rest of the structure of C,,, and the verification of the 
axioms to the reader. 
Conversely, given any anamonoidal category C, we pick (axiom of choice), to any 
pair (A, B) of objects, a particular tensor specification s = sA, B with A, = A, B, = B, 
and define A @ B = A 0, B. The rest of the data for a monoidal category CcS, are now 
supplied easily. Note also that this does not use the unique transfer properties. Finally, 
one notes that, for Can anamonoidal category, CcsJ(a) is isomorphic to C; for this we do 
have to use the unique transfer properties. 
(B) The main argument in favor of the new concept is that it naturally gives the 
right notion of morphism of monoidal categories; this is the direct notion of a struc- 
ture-preserving map. A morphism F: C -+D of anamonoidal categories, an 
“anamonoidal functor”, is the same as a functor between the underlying categories, 
together with maps F : Un [C] -+ Un [D], F : Ten [C] + Ten [D] which are compat- 
ible, in the straightforward sense, with the data. That is, 
F(L) = IF(~)> 
F(&.,) = iFu,Fv~ 
64 0, B) = (FA) C&s FR 
Ha 0s. t 6) = V4 On, or Fb, 
F(L) = &W,FW QLJ = PFW.F~.+. 
Ws,, s,, szr s3) = mso. us,, FS~. us,. 
Recall [8] the notion of a (not necessarily strict) monoidal functor F : C -+X. Consider 
the correspondence between the two types of monoidal category discussed above. If 
C, D are monoidal, then we have a bi,iection 
hom(C, D) --+ hom(C~,), %J (1) 
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(of course, the first horn-set is that of the monoidal functors, the second is that 
of the morphisms of anamonoidal categories): given F E hom(C, D), the correspond- 
ing F(,) E hom(C(,,, D,,,) has its functor-part the same as F, and for 
s = (A, B, i: A @ B”- C) E Ten [C&J, F,,,(s) = (FA, FB,j: FA 0 FBa FC) has 
j = F(i)0 iA,s, the transition isomorphism iA,B : FA @ FB--f% F(A @I B) being given as 
part of the data for F. It is an instructive calculation to see that this mapping is indeed 
a bijection. In other words, the new definition of “anamonoidal category” automati- 
cally gives the right notion of morphism, which in the traditional framework is 
somewhat complicated in its appearance (and, e.g., is not given, presumably for that 
reason, in [23]). 
(C) The concept of a morphism of parallel anamonoidal functors is also more 
natural than the usual formulation. If 
C: D E hom(C, D), 
G 
then h : F -+ G is a natural transformation between the functor-parts of F and G such 
that 
(C.i) for any u E Un[C], hi” = i,,,Gu; and 
(Cii) for any s E Ten [Cl, h,s,B: F(A @,B) + G(A 0, B), i.e., hABSB: FA OFs FB + 
GA @Gs GB, is equal to hA @rS.cShB. 
Then, keeping in mind the usual notion for the monoidal case, we see that the 
mapping (1) is in fact an isomorphism of categories. 
One feature of the non-strict notion of morphism of monoidal categories (in either 
the usual or the new sense) is the (unique) transfer propertyforfunctors: “any functor 
isomorphic to a given one is just as good as the given one”. More precisely, given 
anamonoidal C, D and F E hom(C, D), a functor G : C + D between the underlying 
categories, and h : F 2 G, a natural isomorphism of functors, we can endow G with 
the structure of an anamonoidal functor C+ D, actually in a unique way that 
makes h into an arrow between parallel anamonoidal functors. Furthermore, if C 
is an anamonoidal category, D is a category, F: C+ D is an equivalence-functor 
between categories, there is a way of endowing D with the structure of an 
anamonoidal category and F with the structure of an anamonoidal functor (actually 
equivalence). 
(D) Perhaps the best thing for showing that the present approach to the definition 
of monoidal category is natural is to consider concrete examples. On p. 159 of [23], we 
find the description of the monoidal category (Ab, 0, . . . ) of Abelian groups. A few 
lines above from this description, we find the parenthetical phrase “(any chosen)” in 
connection with Cartesian product, for the purposes of an example of monoidal 
category. The fact that a tensor product has to be chosen for each pair of Abelian 
groups in order to define (Ab, 0, . . . ) is not mentioned, but it is clearly intended. 
The point of our approach is the avoidance of a choice. We define the anamonoidal 
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category (Ab, Ten [Ab], . . . ) by putting Ten [Ab] to be the set of all entities 
s = (A, B,f: A x B + C) such that f is a bilinear function universal among bilinear 
functions from A x B to Abelian groups; we put A, = A, B, = B and A 0, B = C. The 
rest of the definition should be clear. The definition satisfies the unique transfer 
properties, in particular the one for tensor specifications; this is a consequence of the 
fact that the universal bilinear arrow f: A x B -+ C is determined up to a unique 
isomorphism. This fact is of course crucial to ensure that the new sense of Ab being an 
anamonoidal category is related to its being a monoidal category in the usual sense in 
the tight way described above. 
On the basis of the above discussion, I adopt the position that anamonoidal 
categories are a good (or even better) substitute for monoidal categories, and proceed 
to exhibit their sketch-specification. 
I remind the reader that, in Section 1, we have introduced the construction G 1) 9, 
which is an “indexed” version of the simpler one, G) 3, and have even pointed out that 
the category G /I 99 is “better”; it is a (finite, presheaf) topos, while Cl $9 is not (in 
general). Now, the construction G // $9 becomes essential. 
For the notion of (ana)monoidal sketch, we start by taking G = cSk. Let Un be the 
c-sketch whose underlying graph has a single object, say 3, and no arrows; the 
specification sets I [Un], CT[Un] are empty. Let Ten be the c-sketch whose underly- 
ing graph has the three objects 0, 1 and 2, with no arrows; the specification sets 
I [Ten], CT [Ten] are empty. We will write 0 @ 1 for 2, because of the use of Ten (to be 
clarified step by step). 
Consider cSk 11 {Un, Ten}. An object S of cSk 11 {Un, Ten) is a c-sketch ISI, together 
with abstract sets Un [S], Ten[S], and assignments u ++ U, s t--f S of a map 
ti:Un + IS(, s:Ten + ISI to each u~Un[Sl, s~Ten[S]. Intuitively, an object of 
cSk 11 {Un, Ten) is a c-sketch, together with specifications of instances of tensor- 
products and units, with the specifications having “individualizing” tags; thus, the 
very same map S = f may correspond to two different s, t E Ten[S]. 
Next, we perform a construction of the type Cl 9, with G = cSk /I (Un, Ten}. We 
will define objects UnArr, LeftUn, &ghtUn, TenArr and Assoc, of G. We will put 
MonSk d~r G) {UnArr, LeftUn, iiightun, TenArr, Assoc>, (2) 
the category of monoidul sketches. We will give sketch-entailments (arrows) &![Mon] 
in MonSk so that the specification (MonSk, 92 [Mon]) gives, as MonSk : W [Mon] (see 
Section 2), the category of anamonoidal categories (up to isomorphism). For the 
exposition, it is better to mix the descriptions of the specification-types (in the brackets 
in the definition of MonSk) and the axioms. I will number the axioms in the style (Axn). 
64x1) Ex[Un]: 1-1 - 131 
IJn[ ] = {id,,} 
id”, = id,, 
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What is the effect of Ex[Un]? A sketch S satisfies it iff there is a map ~7: fix[Un] + S 
(we continue the custom of using h for the codomain of a sketch-map), that is, iff 
there is s E Un [S]; note that v, necessarily maps 3 to the “value” S(3) of s in S. That is, 
Ex[Un] expresses the existence of (at least one) unit object. 
(Ax2) Ex [ Ten] : I 0 1 I - I 0 1 001 I 
W 1 = lid,,) 
idTen = id,, 
From the specification-types in (2), let me start with TenArr; it has the following 
underlying c-sketch 1 TenArr 1: 
L 
0 
(0.3) I 
3 
1 1 (~5) 1 (1,4) 
4 
5 
with empty I [ ] and CT[ 1. In addition, TenArr[Ten] = { (0, 1,2), (3,4,5) ); 
1(3,4, 5) I: Ten + ITenArrI is the map for which 0 H 3, 1~4,2 H 5; 1 (0, 1,2) I acts 
as the identity. We will write s, t for (0, 1,2) and (3,4, 5), resp., and 
OO,l 
0 1 
a 
I 
aO,,,b 
I 
b 
Ti 7 i 
Oo,i 
for TenArr. Let TenArr+ be the MonSk-sketch with underlying G-sketch TenArr, and 
only additional specification id E TenArr[ 1; and let ‘TenA+ be 
that is, TenArr without the middle arrow. 
We adopt the axiom 
(Ax31 Ex [TenArr] : ‘TenArrl -+ TenArr + 
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(as usual, all arrows in specified sketch-axioms are inclusions as far as possible). 
Ex[TenArr] expresses the existence of the tensor-product of arrows. 
The uniqueness of tensors of arrows is expressed by the codiagonal 
(Ax4) Uni[TenArr] : TenArr+ u TenArr+ + TenArr’. 
‘TenArrl 
Based on the arrow UnArr : ‘UnArrl -+ UnArr, in detail 
0 
I I 
0 * I
UnArr: _ 1 l-1 i 1 
W 1 = (4~1 W I= iu,vl 
ii=o,v= 1 u=o,v= 1 
Is0 [ ] = {i} 
(here, for convenience, we used isomorphism specifications, adjoined to cSk as a first 
step; see Section 5; of course, its use here may be considered an abbreviation), the 
axioms 
(Ax5) Ex [UnArr], 
(‘4x6) Uni [UnArr] 
are formed similarly to the previous two. 
Before describing Assoc, note that Assoc will have an underlying c-sketch lAssoc1, 
and the latter has an underlying graph 11 hsoc 11. 
/I Assoc 11 has six objects, 0, 1,2, 0 @ 1, 1 @ 2,0 0 (1 0 2) and (0 0 1) 0 2; it has 
four arrows: a:0 @ (1 0 2) + (0 @ 1) @ 2, a-i :(0 0 1) 0 2 + 0 0 (1 0 2), 1, and l,_ 1. 
CT[ I ksocl] and I [ I ~ssocl] have specifications expressing that a, a-i are inverses. 
Ten [Assoc] has four elements, si for i < 4, to specify the four tensors in question; e.g., 
S,mapsO~+O, 1~ 1@2,2~0@(1@2). 
rAssocl is the same as Assoc but without a and a-‘. The axioms 
(Ax7) Ex [Assoc], 
(Ax81 Uni [Assoc] 
are then formed, based on ‘Assocl -+ Assoc, as before. The axioms 
(Ax9HAxl2) Ex [LeftUn], Un [LeftUn], Ex [RightUn], Un [RightUn] 
are similar. 
The axioms so far express clauses (i) to (viii) of the definition of anamonoidal 
category. Clauses (ix) to (xiv) are expressed by corresponding axioms (Ax13) to (Ax18) 
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in a straightforward way, involving diagrams similar to those in the clauses them- 
selves; I leave these to the reader. Finally, we have axioms corresponding to the 
transfer clauses (xv), (xvi). 
(Ax19) IsoTransExCTen] : 
Ten [ ] = {s) 
Is0 [ ] = {a} 
I[ I= le,f> 
t E Ten [ ] : 
f:O~0,1~1,2~3 
oETenArr[]:o: (0,3)He, 
0 : (0,4) H f, 0 : (2,5) H a 
(Ax20) IsoTransUni[Ten] T u T + T, 
S 
with S = rIsoTransEx[Ten]‘, T = fsoTransEx[Ten]. 
The preceding two axioms express the existence and uniqueness parts, respectively, 
in clause (xvi). Finally, we have axioms 
(Ax21) IsoTransEx[Un], 
(Ax22) IsoTransUni [Un] 
expressing (xv). 
Any anamonoidal category gives rise to a MonSk-sketch, in the obvious way; the 
resulting sketch allows the unique reconstruction of the anamonoidal category; we 
may identify the two objects. 
Inspection shows that we have: 
an object of MonSk is isomorphic to an anamonoidal category iff it satisjies all 
sketch-axioms of category, and all of the sketch-axioms of anamonoidal category (Axl) 
to (A x 22). Moreover, under this identification, the morphisms of anamonoidal categories 
are bijectively mapped onto maps of sketches. 
Variants and extensions of the concepts of monoidal category can be treated in 
a similar way. Symmetric and braided monoidal categories will have additional 
specifications and axioms corresponding to the symmetry and the braiding, respec- 
tively. For example, the specification of the symmetry is by the sketch Symm = 
A@,B % -B@,A 
A B 
Ten [ ] = {s,t} 
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symmetric monoidal categories will be specified in the sketch-category 
MonSk I{ Symm}. Two of the axioms are Ex [Symm] and Uni [Symm], expressing the 
existence and the uniqueness of the symmetry; note that the symmetry depends on 
tensor specifications. 
The treatment of closed monoidal categories is more understandable if it is based 
explicitly on [27]; I will not go into it here. 
8. Kinds of completeness 
For our purposes here, we will have to be specific about size-restrictions. In our 
previous definitions of categories, we restricted objects to be small; we had in mind (as 
usual) a certain fixed but arbitrary Grothendieck universe 4?e, and “small” meaning 
“belonging to %?JO”. However, we want certain standard “large” categories uch as the 
category of sets to be members of our doctrines. Therefore, we choose (“Grothen- 
dieck’s axiom” [3]) another Grothendieck universe a1 with %,, E ulll, and take each 
of our sketch-categories and doctrines to have their objects restricted to q1 rather 
than “aO; after all, Q. was arbitrary, the notion of “small” is relative. In other words, 
we decide that in the previous sections, “small” should be understood as %l-small; in 
particular, Set, the category of small sets as it appeared in the previous sections, 
should be understood as Setal, the category of %l-small sets. For the category of 
%i-small sets, and for that of ‘?/O-small sets, I will write SET and Set, respectively. 
Note that concepts such as “locally presentable”, “accessible”, etc., depend on the 
choice of the meaning of “small”; the said notions will be understood here with “small” 
meaning 4!!,-small. Under these conventions, Set will be an object of the standard 
doctrines. 
However, when a category is said to be lfp, we will insist that the class of 
isomorphism types of fp objects is (bijectively related to) a %?O-small set. Likewise, in 
the definition of (S, 9) being a finitary doctrine specification, we require that the data 
going into the description of S (the exponent-category X in the initial presheaf 
category SETX, the sets of specification names) and the rule-set B are %!O-small. 
In this section, the word “small” will be meant as ‘V/c,-small”. With all other specific 
notations for categories (Graph, cSk, . . . ) appearing in the previous sections, we stick 
to the decision that they consist of the %,-small objects of the corresponding kind. 
Thus, the underlying graph of Set is an object of Graph; the category sketch associated 
with Set is in cSk, etc. 
We could be very explicit about these things (in the style of [3]), and carry 
the universe-information with all our notations; however, this seemed burdensome 
to me. 
These complications arise because in categorical representation theorems, catego- 
ries of various sizes appear. For example, the embedding theorems for Abelian 
categories refer to arbitrary small Abelian categories, and the specific large categories 
of modules. 
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In Section 4, we gave the specification (cohSk, %![Coh]) for coherent categories. We 
know (for references, see below) that Godel’s completeness theorem is translation- 
equivalent o the representation-theorem for (small) coherent categories; it is now my 
task to point out a completeness theorem in terms of the sketch-based syntax which is 
translation-equivalent to Godel’s completeness theorem. 
There is an obvious guess we can make. Set, the category of small sets, is a member 
of the coherent doctrine cohSk : 2 [Coh]; therefore, for any sketch-entailment (T in 
cohSk, 
t- .#[Coh] 0 - Set + (T. 
If the reverse implication 
Unfortunately, it does not; 
held, we would have a perfect completeness theorem! 
not even for finite 0. Take the sketch-entailment 
f /_I 1 
- 
B 
% I= {3,(1,) = 1s) (gf= l,)~cT[l 
expressing that “every surjective map has a section”. This is valid in Set (axiom of 
choice), but it is not valid in all coherent categories; in particular, it is not deducible 
from d [Coh]. The way out is to suitably restrict the class of entailments forming the 
range of O. Recall exactness properties from Section 5. We have that 
(1) For any exactness property a in cohSk, we have 
In what follows, among others we will obtain a proof (1). In the last section, we will 
indicate why (1) is translation-equivalent to the Giidel completeness theorem (in the 
form saying that a sentence is deducible in the standard Hilbert-type formal system for 
first order logic iff it is valid). 
In fact, we develop a framework for completeness theorems like (l), involving 
representation theorems. We will see, in a general context, that (1) follows from the 
General Completeness Theorem of Section 2, and the representation theorem for 
coherent categories: 
(2) For any small coherent category C, there is a conservative (isomorphism reflecting) 
coherent functor C + Set’ into a suitable Cartesian power Set’ of Set. 
(For references concerning (2) see below.) 
Let S be an lfp category; of course, in practice, S will be a finitary sketch-category. 
Let X be a set of arrows between fp objects of S. Let us call an arrow in S a X- 
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statement, if it is a pushout of an arrow in X. We introduce a notation to deal with the 
latter notion; with given 
s 
* I 
u-v w 
the (a chosen) pushout of the data is denoted as 
4+Jl 
*I q 
*S WI 
i II/’ 
ii 
W 
*i 
(3) 
A X-statement is (up to isomorphism) one of the form $[w] for some w E X and 
arbitrary $. Note that every X-statement is relatively finite (see Section 3). 
Here is a class of examples for X. Suppose that the sketch-category S is based on 
G (recall from Section 4 what this means). Consider the arrows of S of the form 
(K) d,f K + K+, where K is a specification-type of S (over G), and K + is obtained by 
adjoining a single element, the identity, to K in the specification set K [ 1; that is, 
K[K+] = {idK}, and the arrow is the inclusion. We may call the arrows described the 
specijcation-arrows of S (over G). For example, when S = CcSk, the sketch-category 
for Cc categories, and G = Graph, then we have five specification-arrows, one for each 
of the specification types f, eT, f, P and I?xp; the specification-arrow corresponding to 
J?xp is the inclusion 
O* <X0) 2 (2>1) ,l 
J 
(2.3) 
3 
P[ 1 = {ipI P[ 1 = Ii,> 
Exp[ ] = {id} 
(3’) 
Let K be a set of specification-types of S, and let X = X[K] be the set of all finite 
coproducts 
En Pi : ,I;I. ‘V? + Ij @i 
i<n 
Of specification-arrows vi : Qp’ + @i. It is easy to see that when K is the set of all 
specification-types, the finite X [K]-statements are exactly the exactness properties of 
S (over G), in the sense of Section 5. When X = X[K], we say “K-statement” for 
X-statement”. 
For a class P of sketches, the P-X-statements are those X-statements whose 
domain is in P. When X = X[K], we say “P-K-statement” for P-X-statement”. 
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For data as in (3), let us write S bti w to mean that there exists a commutative 
diagram 
S 
dJ 0 I\ u-v 
W 
In other words, Sl=w iff, for all Ic/: U + S, S+#w. 
Let us say that the arrow q: S -P C is X-conservative, if for all (w : U -+ V) E ~$7 and 
for all + : U --t S, C !=:rpz + w implies that S bti w. The picture for this is as follows: 
For any V + C making the square commutative, there is a diagonal making the 
left triangle commutative. We recognize the notion of purity; see [l]; in other 
words, q is X-conservative is to say that v, is pure with respect to the arrows 
in Xx, similarly to the terminology of [l]. We say “K-conservative” for “X[K]- 
conservative”. 
In case X = X [K], this means that p reflects the K-specifications for K E K, that 
is, for any specification-type K E K and y : K +S, if p,,y~K[Cl, then y~K[s]. If 
K consists of the single specification-type ‘Isol (see Section 5), then v, being K- 
conservative means that c~ reflects isomorphisms. 
A family ( q’i : S -+ Ci)icl of arrows with a fixed domain S is X-conservative if the 
induced arrow S + nie 1 Ci is X-conservative. This means that for all 
(w:U-,I/)~~andforallIl/:U-rS,ifforalli~I,C~~,~,,w,thenS~~w. 
Let C and A be classes of objects ofS. We say that C is X-representative with respect 
to A, if for all S E A, the class of all arrows S -+ C with C E C is X-conservative. Spelled 
out, this means the following: 
forany(w:U+V)EX,SEAand+:U-+A,if 
for all q:S + C with C E C, we have CbVctiw, 
then SkG w. 
(4) 
We say “K-representative” for “X [K]-representative”. 
Thus, when S = cohSk, K = {‘Isol}, and A consists of the small objects of 
cohSk:B[Coh], then C = {Set} is X-representative with respect to A; this is the 
representation theorem (2) above. Note that in this case we could have chosen K as the 
set of all specification types, with equivalent results. 
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Let us make two observations. The first is that the condition in line (4) is equivalent 
to cI= *[w]; 
VCEC, Vq:S+C (Cl=;,+w) 0 Cl=$[w] (5) 
(the data for this statement are as in (3)). To see this, assume the left-hand side of (5), 
and consider the diagram 
qi> 
s S[wl 
((I I 0 I 
u 
W 
-V 
in which we want the existence of the slanted arrow to make the triangle commute. 
But the assumption gives V --) C making 
C 
qn I 
s 
i O t “‘\\\i 
u V 
w 
commute; the required S[w] -+ C results from the universal property of the pushout. 
The converse direction of (5) is (even more) obvious. As a result of this observation, to 
say that C is X-representative with respect o A is to say that, for data as in (3), and 
SEA, 
Ct=$[w] + Sb,w; 
moreover, in this equivalence, the right-to-left implication is automatic; we have 
(6) C is X-representative with respect to A iffor any S E A, (w : U -+ V) E ,X’ and 
I+II : U + S (see (3)), the implication 
cI= $[w] *sl=*w (6’) 
holds. 
The second observation is that 
(7) ifC is X-representativefor A, then C is XX-representativefor A, where .X* is the 
class of all X-statements. 
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To see this, we show (6’) for w E Xx*. We have a pushout as in the lower half of the 
following diagram, with w. f X: 
But lclCw1 = (VW Cw01, and 
ct= $[w] - Ck(ll/u)[w,] * s~=Jluwg * Sk, w, 
where the second implication is by the assumed X-representability, and the third by 
the universal property of the upper pushout. 
Now, we introduce another parameter: aclass $! of finite entailments (arrows of S); 
we will be interested in the doctrine S:W. Let P be a class of objects of S. We say that 
the subclass C of S:?2 gives a complete semantics in S:B for P-X-statements, or that 
P-X-completeness holds in S:9 with respect to C, if for any P-X-statement, deducibi- 
lity from 9 is equivalent o validity in C: 
for any P-X-statement y. 
As an example, (1) says that in cohSk:W[Coh], P-X-completeness holds with 
respect o {Set}, with P the set of finite sketches, and X = { (Iso)}. 
A class of examples is obtained by choosing an infinite regular cardinal K, and 
putting P = SK, the class of K-presentable objects of S. In the previous example, 
K = Ko. 
We are going to state a result asserting the equivalence of completeness and 
representability in suitable senses. To have the result in sufficient generality for the 
applications, we bring in the concept of doctrinal hull; see 3.8. Let q* : S + ‘W be 
doctrinal huh of S, and let y : S -P T. We note the equivalence 
Indeed, the left-to-right implication holds since ‘V E S:.GJ?. Conversely, assume 
rJ2Fl=Vp,y, AES:.%, and q:S +A. By rV+V,wy, we have 9:T+W such that 
H 0 ‘/ = q%. By 3.8. (ii), there is $ : r4F -+ A such that I1/opw = q. Thus, ($oO)oy = 9, 
showing that AkOy. 
Proposition 1. Suppose (S, %?) is a jinitary doctrine specification, and Y is a set of 
arrows between fp objects in S. Let P be a class of objects in S such thatfor any S E P, any 
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doctrinal hull of S (with respect to 9) is also in P. Let C be a subclass of S:.%. Then for 
h,(P) the class of doctrinal hulls of members of P, 
C is X-representative with respect to h,(P) (IO) 
if and only if 
P-.X-completeness holds in S:&! with respect to C. (11) 
Proof. Assume (11). to show (10). Because of (6), assume S E h,(P), w: U 4 I/, 
(I/ : U + S and Cl= Ic/ [w], to show Skew. By the right-to-left implication in (S), we have 
k,#$[w] since, by assumption, S E h,(P) c P, and thus $[w] is a P-X-statement. By 
soundness (see 3.2.; the t--,s =z, k=,s direction of 3.3.), and S E h,(P) c S: 3, it follows 
that Sk$[w], hence Sk=,w (see (3’), with an arrow cr:S[w] -tS witnessing 
S I=~~, II/ [w], which gives r~ 0 t,k : V + S witnessing Sk==, w)as desired. 
Assume (lo), to show (11); let y : S + T be a P-X-statement; we want to see that the 
equivalence (8) holds. The left-to-right implication follows from soundness since 
C c S: 9’. Assume Ci=y. Let (pE : S + Q&T be a doctrinal hull of S with respect o 2. By 
3.1. (iv), Cl= ~~[y]. Applying (7), in particular (6’), in the form 
we obtain ‘JV k+,, 1’. Applying (9) we get k&y. The General Completeness Theorem 
(3.3.) gives F,,r as desired. 0 
Recall from Section 2 the (small) cardinal 3 Ls,s,d associated with any finitary doctrine 
specification (S, g). When P = S,, K > As,&, then the condition h,(P) c P of Propo- 
sition 1, is satisfied, by 3.8.(i). In fact, in this case h,(P) = S,n(S:@ d~r (S%Y),, since 
for every S E S:B, S is its own (unique) doctrinal hull. Note that, by Section 2, S:W 
is K-accessible, and in fact 
(12) every object in S&Y is a x-filtered colimit of objects in (S:%),. 
As a corollary, we arrive at the following simpler version of Proposition 1. 
Corollary 2. For (S, Z), X and C as above, and K a regular cardinal, K > & &, we have 
that C is X-representative with respect to S, #‘and only if &-X-completeness holds with 
respect to C. 
The “only if” part of the corollary gives that (2) implies (l), in fact, more generally, 
(1) for 0 an arbitrary small “exactness property”, any small (‘Isol}-statement. 
Above we said that (1) results from (2) and the General Completeness Theorem 
(GCT); here, via the proof of the proposition, we have brought in doctrinal hulls 
again, in addition to the GCT. Here is a proof of the “only if” part of the corollary 
without reference to doctrinal hulls (excepting the implicit ones in the proof of the 
GCT). 
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First, we observe that, under the conditions of the corollary, 
k.dY * (S:@,ky (13) 
for all &-X-statements y. The left-to-right implication is obvious. By the GCT, 
S: 9?!= y =z- t--yly. But by (12) any arrow from the domain of y, a K-presentable object 
in S, into an object in S:W factors through an object in (S: a),; hence, (S:9I?),by 
* S: WI= y. The right-to-left implication in (13) follows. 
Assume that C is X-representative with respect to S,, y is an &-X-statement, 
WE(S:L%?),, and O:dom(y)-+ W. We have 
C%y * cbe[y] j. w+oy 
r t 
3.1 (7) 
This shows that 
ck=y * (S:W),by. 
By (13) it follows that 
cl= y 3 I-& 
which was to be shown. 
The most frequent case of Corollary 2, in practice is obtained by taking K = cc, the 
least non-%!,-small (strongly inaccessible) cardinal; the resulting assertion also follows 
from the conjunction of the cases of Corollary 2 for all K < co. 
Corollary 3. Suppose (S, B) and X are as in Proposition 1. Then any class C objects in 
S: 2 is X-representative with respect to the small members of the doctrine S: 92 if and 
only if C provides a complete semantics in S: 92 with respect to all small X-statements. 
I want to discuss the content of the last corollary in the case of first order logic. For 
this purpose, I bring in, besides the coherent doctrine (figuring in (1) and (2)), the 
doctrine of Boolean categories, BoolSk:9[Bool] (Section 5), and that of finitary 
Grothendieck topologies, GrtopfinSk : W[Grtopfin] (Section 6). Statement (2) above 
expresses that {Set} is ((Iso)}-representative with respect o the small members of 
the coherent doctrine. We have the further representation theorems 
(14) {Set} is {‘Isol}- re resentative with respect to the small members of the Boolean p 
doctrine 
and 
(15) {Set} is (C ov,: n E N}-representative with respect to the small members of the 
doctrine of jinitary Grothendieck topologies. 
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For (15), note that a morphism of finitary Grothendieck topologies is {Cov,: 
n E N}-conservative iff every finite sieve (a family of maps with a common codomain) 
in the domain-category which is mapped into a cover by the morphism is a cover itself; 
briefly, “coverings are reflected”. In (15), Set means the finitary Grothendieck site on 
the category Set consisting of the finite surjective sieves. Thus, (15) says that in a small 
finitary Grothendieck site %‘, a finite sieve is a cover iff it becomes a cover under all 
site-maps from W to Set. 
(15) is essentially identical to Deligne’s theorem asserting that coherent toposes 
have enough points. Deligne’s theorem appears as an Appendix to Expose 6 of [3], 
and dates from 1963. It and its proof have nothing overtly to do with logic. In [24], 
a direct proof of (15) is given, without the detour through toposes. The proof in [24] is 
“purely representation theoretic”, without overt reference to logic; in fact, it can be 
regarded as a “higher dimensional” variant of the standard proof of Stone’s repres- 
entation theorem for distributive lattices (in particular, for Boolean algebras). 
Categorical ogic, initiated by Lawvere, gradually arrived at the insight, mainly due 
to A. Joyal, that Deligne’s theorem is equivalent o Godel’s completeness, more 
precisely, to the uncountable generalization of it given by Mal’cev in the 1930s. In 
[30], the proof of Deligne’s theorem is given by applying Gijdel completeness through 
a two-way translation process between logical operations and categorical operations; 
the precise spelling-out of the translation is in fact the main point of [30]. See also 
[16] for a reformulation of Deligne’s proof, as well as a sketch of the argument of [30] 
(announced in [29]). 
The representation theorem (2) for the coherent doctrine can be easily derived from 
(15); this is done in [24]. It also follows rather directly from Deligne’s original theorem 
(via the “classifying topos” of the coherent category). (14) is a special case of (2), 
similarly to the fact that the Stone representation theorem for Boolean algebras is 
a special case of that for distributive lattices. 
By Corollary 3, and as a consequence of (2), (14) and (15), respectively, we have: 
(16) For any small {‘Isol}-statement o in cohSk, 
I- lCCohl 0 * Set I= 0. 
(17) For any small {Cov,: n E N}-statement CJ in GrtopfinSk, 
t- ZPCGrtopfinl 0 * Set + g. 
(18) For any small (‘Id)-statement 0 in BoolSk, 
t- JP[Bool] g o Set != g. 
From the representation theorem (15) for Grothendieck topologies, we can also 
deduce that Set is representative with respect o the small members of the doctrines 
regSk : B[Reg] (the doctrine of regular categories), exSk : &?[ex] (the doctrine of 
Barr-exact categories), dSk : W[dis] (the doctrine of distributive categories), 
pretop : .c% [pretop] (the doctrine of pretoposes). As consequences, we have the specific 
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completeness theorems saying that in any of these doctrines, an (co-)exactness 
property is deducible from the axioms of the doctrine iff it is valid in Set. The 
representation theorem with Set as the semantic object for flSk : 9 [fl], the doctrine of 
categories with finite limits, is essentially trivial; the resulting specific completeness 
theorem is less so. 
To state further completeness theorems, some remarks on exactness properties. In 
a doctrine of structured categories, a morphism is faithful in the usual sense iff it is 
{CT}-conservative, quivalently, {I, CT}- conservative. For all doctrines of structured 
categories which contain in their specification the type of pullback as well as the 
axioms for pullback, and in which all operations are defined by universal properties 
(as in Section 4), {rIsol}-conservativeness implies (hence, is equivalent o) full conser- 
vativeness, that is, K-conservativeness for K the class of all specification-types. It
requires more structure to have {CT}-conservativeness (faithfulness) to be the same as 
full conservativeness; for pretoposes, this holds, but for coherent categories, it does 
not. 
The conclusion in the sentence before the last is also valid for the doctrine of 
F-categories (see Section 5); F-categories form a doctrine of structured categories, 
but F-quantification is not defined by a universal property. 
The same, mutatis mutandis, can be said for the doctrine of SCcategories (Sect- 
ion 4); this is based on G = Graph’ rather than Graph. 
In the next two paragraphs, “representative” means “{‘Isol}-representative with 
respect o small objects”, the most common concept of representation in categorical 
logic. 
The class of Grothendieck toposes are representative in the doctrine 
HeySk : L%[Hey] of Heyting categories, with respect o small objects and fully conser- 
vative maps. In fact, the subclass of presheaf-toposes SetC (C small category), and also 
the class of localic toposes Sh(L), with L a frame, is representative. These facts are 
essentially Kripke’s completeness theorem [19] and Rasiowa’s and Sikorski’s com- 
pleteness theorem for intuitionistic logic [32,33], respectively. The class of presheaf 
toposes are representative in the doctrine biHeySk : W [biHey] of biHeyting catego- 
ries; see [31]. 
The S4-categories (see Section 5) of the form 
with C a small category, 1CJ its set of objects, and ( )’ the canonical functor, are 
representative in the doctrine S4Sk : B[IJ] of SCcategories. This is related to 
Kripke’s completeness theorem for S4 modal predicate logic [18], but mathematically 
is somewhat stronger; for the exact form quoted here, see [31]. 
Several other completeness theorems in [31] are stated in the form of representa- 
tion theorems for doctrines whose sketch-specifications should be easy to produce on 
the basis of the examples in this paper. 
260 M. MakkailJournal of Pure and Applied Algebra 115 (1997) 241-274 
Keisler’s completeness theorem [17] can be translated into saying that the p- 
category Set with the IC = K1 interpretation is representative with respect o the class 
LA? of countable F-categories (and with respect o the fully conservative maps); see also 
the next section. The corresponding sketch-based completeness theorem results by 
Corollary 2, with the choice K = Ki. 
Next, we describe a representation theorem concerning Cartesian closed categories 
due to Cubric [S, 61, and the corresponding specific completeness theorem; this uses 
Proposition 1, rather than Corollaries 2 or 3. 
In the case of the doctrine of Cartesian closed categories (Ccc’s), we have the notion 
of the free Ccc over any graph, and, in fact, thefree Ccc over any C&k-sketch S as the 
Ccc p(S), with the sketch-map is : S -+ F(S), such that Ccc* (F(S), C) + CcSk (S, C) 
defined by composition with i, is an equivalence of categories. Here Ccc* (F(S), C) is 
the category of all Ccc-morphisms F(S) + C, with all natural isomorphisms a arrows; 
and CcSk (S, C) is the category whose objects are the sketch-maps S + C, and whose 
arrows are the natural isomorphisms between them as between maps from a graph to 
a category. F(S) is determined up to equivalence of categories. 
It turns out that, up to equivalence of categories, the F(S) for a fixed S are the same 
as the doctrinal hulls of S. In other words, 
(19) if i,:s -+ rd4F is any doctrinal hull of S, then i,: S --, ‘W has the universal 
property of is : S + R(S). 
This latter fact will be presented in [26] in a more general context. 
Cubric’s representation theorem concerns Ccc categories of the form F(G) for 
a graph G, that is, a CcSk-sketch with all specification-sets empty; let us call a Ccc of 
the form F(G) for a graph G a free Ccc. Cubric’s theorem says that 
(20) (Cubric) Any free Ccc has a faithful Ccc jiinctor to Set. 
Now, let us call a sketch Sfiee if there are a graph G and an cc -deduction I,+ : G + S. 
Consider the following class P of small CcSk-sketches. Since the composite of two 
composable co-deductions is again an co-deduction, therefore in case $ : G + S is an 
co-deduction, any doctrinal hull of S is a doctrinal hull of G as well. Thus, the class 
S free of free sketches is closed under taking doctrinal hulls. We conclude that 1. is 
applicable to obtain that 
(21) ~[CC] is a complete axiomatization with respect o Sf,,,-{CT}-statements in 
CcSk true in Set 
(a paraphrase of “Sf,ee-{CT}-completeness holds in CcSk:%?[Cc] with respect to 
{Set}“). 
The finite S ,,,-{CT}-statements are obtained by taking a finite graph G, extending 
G by applying the rules of Ccc’s to obtain, say, G -+ S, and, finally, arbitrarily equating 
two parallel arrows f and g in S, resulting in G + S + S[f= g]. The truth of the 
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statement G -+ S [f = g] in a Ccc C is that ‘f and g are necessarily equal” in C; that is, 
whenever G is interpreted in C via a map q: G -+ C, inducing an essentially uniquely 
determined extension @ : S -+ C, then @(‘(f) = q’(g). (21) says that if G -+ S [ f = g] is 
true in Set, then it is deducible from the axioms for Ccc’s. 
It is well-known that the restriction to the Sr,,, cannot be removed from the Cubric 
completeness theorem; see [S, 61. 
Let us turn to compactness. Consider a finitary sketch-category S, and a class X of 
fp maps in S as before, but not any rule-set 9 as yet. A finite X-statement CI is afinite 
(X-)approximation of the X-statement q if v, is a pushout of cr; notice that any 
pushout of a X-statement is a X-statement. Let P and C classes of objects in S. We 
say that P-X-compactness holds with respect to Cif for any P-X-statement c(, if CI holds 
in C, then there is a finite approximation of LX which also holds in C (notice that the 
converse is automatic, and in fact that o! is deducible from any approximation of it). 
Proposition 4. P-X-compactness holds with respect to C ifand only ifthere is a set .B of 
fp arrows in S such that P-X-completeness holds in S: 9 with respect to C. 
Proof. The “only if” part is obvious: take W to be the set of finite approximations of 
the P-.X-statements that are true in C. 
For the converse, let 3’ be a set of fp arrows. We show that if a X-statement o! is 
deducible from W, then there is a finite approximation of tl that is also deducible from 
R; this will clearly suffice. 
Assume n is an integer 2 0, and;= (ri : Ri -+ R:), <, 5 n is a sequence of fp arrows. 
An v-system consists of data of the form 
S$+S$+S,~S3+ . . . +s,_,~s, (22.1) 
and. for every 1 I i < n, a pushout diagram 
The displayed r-system is finite if each Si is an fp object. 
An arrow to the displayed v-system from the Gsystem 
(22.2) 
r, 
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is given by arrows pi: s^i + Si for i < n such that 
and such that $i = ci- 1~ $i, I/I: = Oi 0 I& for all 1 I i I n. Composition of arrows of 
r-systems is obvious; thus,%ystems form a category S;. It is pretty clear that filtered 
colimits in S; exist, and they are computed componentwise. We prove by induction 
on the length IZ of r that 
(23) every r-system is a directed colimit ofjinite r-systems. 
For n = 0, the assertion holds since the object S is a directed colimit of fp objects. 
For the induction step, suppose thezsystem (22.1), (22.2) forrof length n, and assume 
(induction hypothesis) that the 7 dyr (ri : Ri -+ RI), 2 i 2 n _ i-system obtained by delet- 
ing the data indexed by II is the colimit of a diagram of the finite T-systems 
indexed by p ranging over a directed poset P. Then, in particular, S,_ 1 = colim, Si_ 1, 
with colimit coprojections zi_ 1 : S%_ I + S, 1, say. Since R, is fp, there is p. E P such 
that 1c/,, : R, + S,_ 1 factors through zp_ 1 : Sr_ 1 -+ S,- 1 as en = I:_ 1 o I@ for a suitable 
$;IR,,+S~_~. Let P, = (p E P:p, < p} be ordered as P is, a directed poset, and for 
PEPO> 
where ~p_~i” : Sp_ I + Si_ 1 is the connecting map for the diagram of the S,P_ 1. Con- 
sider, for each p E P,,, the pushout 
Rn r, (24) 
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defining Si, cpf and r+Vi; note that Si is fp. By the universal property of the pushout 
(24), we have 1:: S: -P S, such that 
4l r,, *R:, 
We also have similarly defined connecting maps 0: ’ q : S: + Sz. By (22.2) for i = n, it 
follows that S, = colimPEPO Sf: with coprojections I:. 
We have all the data needed to show that the given Fsystem is indeed a directed 
colimit of finite Gystems, which completes the proof of (23). 
Now, suppose that the X-statement CI: S + T is deducible from ,c%. Then, we have 
n 2 0, a sequence 7 = (ri : Ri + Ri), si<n of arrows Yi E 9, an Zsystem (22.1) (22.2) 
with SO = S, and a diagram 
u-v 
w (25) 
withwEX;here,~~,=~~o~,_,o..’ 0 ql. Applying (23), let a P-indexed diagram of 
the finite r-systems 
(one for each p E P, P a directed poset) be such that its colimit is the given one, with 
coprojections $: Sp + Si. Since U and V are fp, there is p E P such that U: U + S 
factors as u = rg 0 u’ for some u’: U + SpO, and the composite rv: I/ + S, factors as 
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zv = zf: 0 ( for a suitable t : R, + St such that 
Let us consider the pushout 
This fits into the following two diagrams: 
(qo,g,= c.p,np~$7;-~~ .” 0 97) such that, in addition, vu’ = [ and iv’ = u (the pushout 
character of the upper square of the second diagram follows from (25)). Then (Y’ is an fp 
arrow, which is deducible from the first diagram in (26) (since &, is directly deduc- 
ible), and which is a finite X-approximation of M by the second diagram in (26). This 
completes the proof of Proposition 4. 0 
In the next section, we will show that in case the traditional concept of compactness 
is available, namely in the case of first order logic and its extensions with generalized 
quantifiers, our concept is equivalent o the traditional one. 
Proposition 4 says that compactness is equivalent to axiomatizability by a set of 
finite axioms. The corresponding assertion in the traditional context is a well-known, 
and trivial, fact. Of course, the completeness theorems mentioned above as examples 
each have a corollary in the way of a compactness assertion. 
In the traditional context, by abstract completeness we mean the recursive enumer- 
ability of validities. Abstract completeness is held up as the essential content of 
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completeness, independent of a specific axiomatization. Of course, compactness i also 
such an “essential content”, but less “basic” in some sense (certainly less finitary). As 
we noted in Section 3, when we are in a finite sketch-category, the set 
58[L%] = {s:l-, > ff s o ormal consequences of an r.e. set 2 of rules is r.e. As it happens, 
in most cases in practice we have a$nite set %? of rules that axiomatizes the concept at 
hand. Of course, in all these cases, abstract completeness holds, where, formally, we 
say that, with respect to any given parameters S, xx, P and C as before, abstract 
completeness holds if the set of finite P&-statements valid in C form an r.e. set. 
The value of the notions introduced in this section lies in their uniformity and 
conceptual simplicity. Now it is possible to ask, concerning categorically given logics, 
questions, the kind of which the logicians used to ask about logics defined by 
generalized quantifiers. For instance, consider the doctrine of finite limits and finite 
colimits (thus, this extends the doctrine of pretoposes by having arbitrary co- 
equalizers). Is the set of exactness properties with domain a free sketch (defined now in 
flcSk (see Section 4) as free sketches were in CcSk) that are true in Set recursively 
enumerable; finitely axiomatizable? There are a number of interesting questions of 
completeness concerning notions of monoidal categories. Our framework does not 
materially help in solving these problems, it only gives a convenient formulation to 
them. 
9. Sketch-semantics versus Tarskian semantics 
In this section, I explain how Tarski-type semantics can be related to sketch- 
semantics. This may contribute to a better understanding of sketch-semantics. We will 
see that compactness in the usual sense for a generalized quantifier with a specific 
semantics is equivalent to compactness in the sense of the previous section for 
appropriately chosen parameters. In the case when we have axiomatizability (as for 
instance we do for the case of the “there are uncountably many” quantifier), we will 
establish the existence of a recursive translation in both directions between deductions 
in the usual sense and in the sketch-based sense. We will stop short of spelling out an 
explicit translation of one kind of deduction into the other, although it would not be 
difficult to do it. 
For specificity, let us consider (full, finitary, possibly multi-sorted) first order logic 
with (sorted) equality, with a new quantifier 9x added. Thus, formulas are formed as 
in first order logic, together with a new formation-rule, allowing F”lxq as a formula for 
any formula q. For specificity, we consider t (true; 0-ary operator), A ,l and 3 as 
primitive, and the other first-order operators as abbreviations in the usual way. The 
notions of free and bounded variables, alphabetic variants, proper substitution and 
the like remain essentially the same as in ordinary first order logic; the F-quantifier is 
handled syntactically just as 3x and Vx are. 
A semantics of the B quantifier is specified by giving a class Y of pairs (X, A) of sets, 
with A being a subset of X, subject to the condition of invariance under isomorphism: 
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whenever f:Xz Y and (X, A) E 9, then (Y,f[A]) E Y. We write 
9[X] zr {A c x: (X, ‘4) E 9}. 
We have the example, with any fixed cardinal K, of the semantics yK consisting of 
those (X, A) in which the cardinality of A is less than K. With K = HI, this is the 
semantics we had in mind in Section 6 in connection with “8-categories”. A “dual” 
semantics 9’ would have (X, A) E 9 iff #(X - A) < K; still another dual would have 
(X, A) E Y iff #A 2 K. Both of these latter quantifiers are expressible using 9 in the 
first sense. 
More “interesting” quantifiers can be introduced, by allowing the quantifier to bind 
more than one variable at a time, or even allowing quantification of variables ranging 
over subsets of the universe of the model, etc; see [4b]. The translations and con- 
clusions given below have counterparts in the more involved situations as well. 
Given a semantics Y as described, we can evaluate formulas in any structure. From 
now on, we consider Y fixed. 
Let L be a language in the usual sense, that is, a collection of sorts, and sorted 
relation-symbols; for the sake of simplicity of exposition, we disallow operation- 
symbols. The notion of L-structure is the usual one. Z,y, . . . always denote a proper 
variable sequence, that is, a finite sequence of distinct, sorted, variables. xis oftype 2 if 
2’= Cxi)* <isn, Z = (X,)1 lisn and xi:Xi (xi is of sort Xi). 
An entity [%I ~1 (actually, simply an ordered pair (2, q)), where ~7 is a formula with 
all free variables in 2, is called an (L-)formal set, or L-set. Two formal sets [ 2: ~1 and 
[y: $1 are identified if ?, 5; are of the same type, and q[$?], the result of properly 
(possibly renaming bound variables to avoid clashes) substituting 7 for 2, is an 
alphabetic variant of + (is obtained from $ by properly renaming bound variables). 
The type @[I?: 91 is the type of 2. 
Given any L-structure M, M [s;‘l denotes the Cartesian product nl= I M(Xi), where 
7isoftypeZ=(Xi)15z2n. The semantics Y provides the definition of M [ Zi: p], or 
M,,, [Z: p], the (Y-)meaning of [Z’: ~1 in M, a subset of MC?], by recursion on the 
structure of q. The clauses with respect to the atomic formulas and the first-order 
logical operators are the usual ones. The specific clause related to 9’ is this: 
(here, it is assumed that y is not among 2; because of the possibility of renaming bound 
variables, this is not a real restriction; of course, & denotes the concatenation 2i* (b), 
and similarly for Ziy). We say that M is an Y-model of the 0, Mk,9 O, or M k Q 
when Y is understood, if M [8: 01 = MC@: t] = 1 = true. Models of T form 
a groupoid (category) Mod(T) (or Mod9 (T)), with morphisms the isomorphisms of 
LT-structures; we ignore all morphisms but the isomorphisms. 
We consider P-sketches, objects in the sketch-category KSk defined in Section 6; 
of course 9Sk is independent of the semantics Y. However, 9 gives rise to a specific 
object Set,,, in 9Sk. As far as the specification-types for BoolSk (= cohSk) are 
concerned, Set,, is given as the Boolean category Set. For the specification-type 4 (see 
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Section 6), we set (a: & + Set) E @[Seq9J iff for all y E OY, 
3y’ E @B.cDby’ = y. o {x E QX: 3 x’ E cDA.Qax’ = x & Ofx = y.} E Y [@Xl 
(when @a and @b are inclusions of sets, which may be assumed without essential loss 
of generality, this becomes 
For any (small) F-sketch S, the collection of sketch-maps S + Set,,,, the Y-models of 
S, form a groupoid Mod(S) (or more explicitly, Mod&S)), where a morphism 
h: M -+ N is, by definition, a (natural) isomorphism h: M 5 N between M and N as 
maps from the underlying graph /I 9 /I to the category Set (thus, we ignore all but the 
isomorphism mappings of models). 
For L a language, an L-fragment F is a set of L-sets such that 
[T:cpAl)]EF * [z:q7]EFF[CSZ:lj]EF, 
[xx’: x = xx’] E F for all sorts X (x, x’: X), 
[@:t]eF. 
An augmented theory is a triple T = (L, F, C) = (LT, F,, CT), with L a language, F an 
L-fragment, C a set of L-sentences uch that for CT E C, [8 : a] E F. (In contrast, a simple 
theory is a pair (L, C) of a language L and a set C of sentences; in what follows, until 
further notice, theories are augmented.) A sequence _? = (Xi)1 s i s n of sorts occurs in 
T if either Lr has a relation-symbol R sorted as “R-X1 x ... x X,“, or if FT contains 
a formal set [?: ~1 of type 2. A model of T is a model of the corresponding simple 
theory (obtained by omitting the fragment); the notation Mod(T) is used accordingly. 
With any augmented theory T, we associate an F-sketch S = S[T]; S consists of 
the following data (1.1) to (1.12). 
(1.1) For every sort X EL, an object X in S. 
(1.2) For every _? = (X,), slsn occurring in T, an object denoted r?, or nl= 1 Xi, 
together with arrows zi : fly= r Xi -+ Xi (1 I i I n), and the specification to the effect 
that (ni)i “is a product diagram”. When 2 is of type 2, [Z] means 2. 
(1.3) For every relation-symbol “R-X1 x ... x X,” in L, an object R and an arrow 
R ?Q fly= i Xi in S, together with the specification that mR “is a monomorphism”. 
(1.4) For every formal set [Zi: (01 in F, an object [ST: q] and a “monomorphism” 
ml,:,1 : CT: ~1 + [xl. 
(1.5) When @ = [S;: ~1 = [xx’: x = xx’], the specifications to the effect that 
m, : @ +-+X x X “is the diagonal”. 
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(1.6) When @ = [z: q] with q the atomic formula Rul ... uk, with 
“R + U1 x ... x Up,;= (Xi)lsr<n, xi:Xi, Uj=Xi,, Uj=x,,, a “pullback diagram” 
together with the specification that 71 “is the morphism 
(7C,,)j: fi Xi + fi uj, 
i=l j=l 
for the projections rc,, : nl= I Xi + X,“. 
(1.7) For every formal set of the form [S;: 3yq-j in FT, a diagram 
together with the specification that the rightmost vertical “is a product projection”, 
and the data (in the form of the obvious map ?i -+ ) S I being an element of 3 [IS]) that 
the diagram is a &specification. 
(1.8) For every formal set of the form [S;:P-yq] in FT, the diagram 
understood as a map & + ISI in the obvious way is in @[S]. 
(1.9), (1.10) and (1.11) Data explaining [Yi:t], and ones relating [T:q A $1 and 
[?:lp] to [S;: q], [S;: $1 in the style of (1.7) and (1.8). 
(1.12) For every z E Z, the specification that mgLr,: [O: z]-[k?~: t] “is an isomor- 
phism”. 
Note that if T is finite (meaning that LT, FT, CT are all finite), then S[T] is a finite 
sketch. Moreover, the map T H S[T], restricted to hf augmented theories T, is 
a recursive one. 
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We have a close connection between models of T and models of S[T]. Every model 
M of T gives rise to a model fi : S [ T] + Set(,,, for which 
fix is MX for sorts X, 
&?(nl= r Xi) is chosen to be the standard Cartesian product nl= 1 MXi for the 
products fly= r Xi under (1.2), 
For “R-fly=, Xi”, i@R is MR( c nl=, MXi), and fi(m,) is the inclusion 
MR + Jjl= 1 MXi, 
each Q[S;: ~1 is chosen to be equal to M[Yi: p], 
and the rest of the items for fi also are chosen in the “standard” ways. 
This map M ++l\;i extends to a functor 
Mod(T) + Mod(S[T]). (2) 
To see this, we first characterize (iso)morphisms im Mod(S[T]). 
(3) Let I, J E Mod(S[T]). Assume (k, : IX -% JX)* is a family of bijections in- 
dexed by the sorts in Lr such that, for every “R-X1 x ... XX," in L, there is 
a (necessarily unique) k, making 
commute. Then there is a unique h:I -% J for which hx = kx for all X E Sort [Lr]. 
(Clearly, the condition on (kx)x is necessary for the existence of such h.) 
Indeed, we define hx = kx, hz = nl= 1 kxi, hR = kR from (4). Next, we define the 
components her;, ql : I [Z: cp] 5 J [St: ~1 by recursion on the structure of [?q] so that 
For this, we use the items (1.7) to (1.1 l), and the fact that the diagrams in those items 
are mapped by I and J into such diagrams in Set with known properties. Note 
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especially that the recursion-step for the case of [?:9yq] uses the assumption of 
isomorphism invariance of 9’. Finally, we need to define the components of h at 
certain auxiliary objects that come up in items (1.7) to (l.ll), e.g., the P in (1.7); these 
are also uniquely determined under the naturality requirement. 
To define the functor (2), we note that if h : M 5 N, we can put kx = hx and have 
that each diagram (4) commutes for suitable kR since it is the same as 
MR 
incl 
$Im 
ntR 
incl -fiw ,=, 
6: fi -+ Z? is given by (3) such that i;x = hx for sorts X. 
We have that the functor (2) is an equivalence of categories. In fact, we have that 
every model I : T + Set,,, gives rise to the L,-structure r”, for which I”X = IX, and for 
“R-fly= 1 Xi” I”R is defined by the diagram 
incl 
. 
in Set where the right-hand vertical arrow is the canonical bijection between a stan- 
dard Cartesian product and another product in Set. Moreover, I”is a model of T, and 
I : (r”,^ r I by a unique isomorphism 1 whose components lx, X a sort, are identities; the 
unique existence of 1 is ensured by (3). 
Let now T be a simple theory T = (LT, C,), and o and LT-sentence. As usual, we 
write T b’y o for saying that (T is a consequence of T under the Y-semantics, that is, 
every Y-model M of T is an Y-model of cr. 
Consider the augmented theory T ICJ,T~ (LT, F, I&), where F is the least fragment 
for which [8 : z] E F for all z E C, and [@ :o] E F; let T 11 (T zf (LT, F, C+J{C}) with the 
same F. Consider the sketches S [Tla], S [T /I a]. Note that the second is obtained 
from the first by adding a single isomorphism specification, specifying that 
m~~.,,:[O:(rl -+ [(b:tl is an isomorphism. Let aT,a be the inclusion S [T I a] --+ S [T 1) CT]. 
Note that MT,a is an {rIsol}-statement. I claim that 
T+=,o o Set,,,+=C(r,o. (5) 
First of all, we note that for I E Mod(S[T la]) to have Set,,,kl c(T.0 is the same as to 
have that Z(mrO:.,) is an isomorphism. It is clear that this property is invariant under 
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isomorphism in Mod(S(Tlo]); if I E’ J, and Set(SpjbIC(T,a, then Set(,,+,tzT,.. Now, 
assume that T bTF g, and I E Mod(S[T la]). Let M = 1 Since M!= T, we have that 
M+a. Consider J = i@. By the definition of fi, and M!=a, we have that J(mce:.,) is an 
isomorphism, that is, Set,y, kJ UT, ,,. But, 3 1 I, hence also Set,,, l=r !xr,a as was to be 
shown. The converse is similar and simpler. 
Let us pause to consider the equivalence (5). 
First of all, we have a version for pure first order logic, without the F-quantifier; to 
obtain this, in the above, ignore all references to B and 9. We have 
(6) 
for any first-order theory T, sentence [T in the language of T, and the corresponding 
BoolSk-sketch entailment ar,O. Now, let us apply both the Giidel-Mal’cev complete- 
ness theorem and the sketch-based completeness theorem 8.(18) for first-order logic. 
First, we apply Godel’s to conclude that 
where “T F 6’ means that “0 is deducible in T” in the standard formal system. 
Second, 8.(18) says that 
t A[Bool] ET. .J - set!=aT.o. 
We conclude that 
(8) 
T I- 0 * ~.W[Bool, aT,o. (9) 
In other words, there is a deduction d of o in T in the ordinary sense iff there is 
a sketch-deduction d’ of uT.o from the rules W[Bool]. Given that the construction of 
aT,o from T and (T is effective, and both notions of deduction are effective, we find that 
there are recursive functions assigning a d’ to any d, and another one, assigning a d to 
any d’; in other words, 
(10) there are recursive functions of the variables T and 0, a finite theory and 
a sentence, respectively, in classical first order logic, assigning a sketch-deduction of 
KT,O ,from PZ[Bool] to any ordinary deduction of o from T, and vice versa. 
It is possible to describe such recursive functions quite explicitly, by extending the 
translation process started above to deductions. 
The above translation of symbolic logic into sketch-logic allows us to infer com- 
pactness or abstract completeness for symbolic logic from the same-named property 
(understood in the sense of the last section) for sketch-logic. 
A subtheory of the (simple) theory T is any (simple) theory T’ such that Lr, c LT 
and CT’ c CT. Let us write T’ I T if this holds. For any theory T, the finite 
subtheories of T, ordered under I , form a directed poset. Let T and the LT-sentence 
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(T be fixed, and let us write T’ < ,, T if T’ I T, T’ is finite, and [r is an L,,-sentence. For 
any T’l,T, we have the inclusion maps +:S[T’la] -fS[Tla], 
aT,:SIT’IIa]jSITl/a]. It is easy to see that 
(11) S[Tlo] = colimS[T’Io], 
T's,T 
with colimit coprojections the lr,, and similarly for S [T II a]. Now, let K be a cardinal, 
possibly co, and let us consider the property of Ic-compactness for the Y-semantics: 
this holds if for any theory T of cardinality < K in first-order logic extended with 9, 
and any Lr-sentence (r, T by (r iff for some T’ I d T (in particular, T’ is finite), 
T ‘k.v 0. We have that, for K any uncountable regular cardinal, 
(12) rc-compactnessfor Y-semantics is implied by SK-{‘Iso’}-compactness for { Setty,} 
in 9Sk. 
Indeed, assume S,-(rIso?}-compactness for (SetC,Y,) in 9Sk, and let T be a theory 
of cardinality < K such that Tk9cr. Then, by (5), SetC,Y)k=CIT,,. CI~,~ is an SK-{rIsol}- 
statement. Hence, there iS a finite {‘ISO1}-apprOXimatiOn fi: u + T/ of ar,o, 
u 
B 
*V 
such that Se$,,,l= /?. By (1 l), and since U is finite, there is T’ I D T such that we have 
the diagram 
IT,, 
Wlal - W’II al 
Wlal 
%,a 
-W’ II al 
in which IT’ ou’ = u and ‘iT’Oa’ = v; the fact of the pushout marked 3 follows from 
those marked 1 and 2. We conclude that Set&==aT,,a, which, by (5) again, means 
T’l=o a as desired. 
We also have, almost immediately, from (5) that: 
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(13) Abstract completeness for &x-order logic with the Y-quantijier is implied by 
abstract completeness for S = FSk, X = X [ (‘Isol)], P = SNo, and C = (Set,,,,}. 
We also have the converses of (12) and (13) (obtained by replacing “is implied by” 
with “implies”). To prove these statements, we need to develop a translation of 
sketch-semantics into Tarskian semantics. 
To any F-Sk-sketch S, we associate a simple theory T[S] = (L,, C,) such that we 
have an isomorphism 
Mod,,,,(S) z Mod~zt,VCSI) (14) 
of groupoids. The language Ls of T[S] is, by definition, the underlying graph of S; 
that is, the sorts of Ls are the objects of S, Ls has a unary operation symbol ‘tf: A -+ B” 
for each arrow f: A + B of S, and Ls has no other symbols. The axioms of T[S] 
correspond to the specifications in S; each specification of S is “expressed” by an 
axiom. In 8Sk, we have the specification-type f, pb, ‘Isol, ‘Monk, 2, &join and &. We 
will give the axioms corresponding to the pb-and the &-specifications. For the rest, 
the reader may consult [30, pp. 90-921, where axioms are used for a similar task of 
“expressing”. Recall that pb is 
f 
o-2 
PI 
IA 
h g 
3-l 
PZ 
CT [ I= {fp,=h, gp,=hJ 
For each p E Ijb [S], we adjoin the following axiom to Cs (here and below, for easier 
reading, we write ii for p(a) for all arguments a of 9): 
~~:5.fp,~=~~~gp,~=~~.~v~:~.~~:i.~h=g~~3 
-- 
!z:3.p,z = x&&z = y.). 
Recall that $ is 
A’X 
I 
f 
B,Y 
mon[]={a,b} 
Given q E &@ [S], Ax abbreviates the formula 3x’ E A.&x’ = x, and similarly for By. 
For each q E & [S], we adjoin the following axiom to &: 
Vy: Y(ByttPx : X(Wx&Tx = y)). 
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Notice that both Mod,,,(S) and Mod,,V,(TIS]) are subcategories of Hom( )/ S //, 
Set) = Str(Ls); the graph-maps I/ S 11 + Set are the same things as the Ls-structures. 
Inspection shows that ModC,Y, (S) and Mod,,, (T[S]) are identical as subcategories of 
Horn (/I S /I, Set) = Str(L,); that is, in (14), the isomorphism is the identity. 
The (rIsol}-statements in FSk are the sketch-entailments of the form 
Inv[S,f] : S ---f s’, where S is any sketch, fis an arrow in S, and S’ is obtained from 
S by adding a specification saying that ‘tf is an isomorphism” (see Section 5). Let 
Iso[fIj denote the Ls-sentence Vb : El! a : A.f(u) = b; here, f: A + B. Then, for any 
A4 E Mod(,,(S) = Mod,,Y,(TIS]), SetC,V,+,Inv[S,f] iff Ml=Iso[f]. It immediately 
follows that 
TCSIbIsoCfl - Set,,,k InvCSJl. (15) 
Let us write S’ I / S for S’ is a finite sub-sketch of S andfbelongs to S’. When S’ I ,S, 
Inv[S’,f] is a finite approximation of Inv[S,f] and T[S’] I ,sOcr,TIS]. T[S] is the 
directed union (colimit) of the theories T[S’] for S’ ranging over all S’ such that 
s’ Ifs. 
Now assume that rc-compactness holds for the .Y-semantics, and Set,,,l=Inv[S,f]. 
Then, by (15), T[S] bY Iso [f], and there is some S’ I s S for which T[S’] FV Iso[f], 
and by (15), Set,:/, bInv[S’,f], which shows that 
(16) K-compactness for 9’-semantics implies S,$Isol}-compactness for {Set,,,,} in 
FSk. 
(15) immediately gives that 
(17) Abstract completenessforjrst-order logic with the Y-quantijier implies abstract 
completeness for S = 9Sk, X = X[{rIsol}], P = SNo, and C = {Set,,V,). 
